We analyze how a principal should set his promotion rule when the agents have career concerns and compete with each other to get promoted. When the principal uses promotion as an incentive scheme to increase the agents' effort, the rule may or may not favor the agent with higher expected ability. However, when the principal uses promotion to pick the best agent, the rule always gives higher promotion probability to the agent with higher expected ability.
used for two purposes: first to provide incentive for the agents who value the higher positions to work harder; second, to screen employees so that agents are assigned to the jobs that fit them best.
However, considering the promotion process as a tournament, they claim that the two roles of promotions are not compatible. For those who have no chance of winning the positions, or those who have sure chance of winning, promotion cannot provide incentive. When employees are alike, the tournament for promotion can provide most incentive, but then the matching is not important. When people are different, the tournament offers little signal about who is the best for the higher-level job. Worse yet, when the requirements for the higher-level job differ much from those in the tournament stage, the winner in the tournament is not likely to be the right person; namely, the Peter Principle occurs.
Since promotions occur in dynamic settings, the agents have career concern as well when they choose their effort facing promotion-based incentives. Therefore promotions might perform better than what (Baker et al., 1988) picture. Furthermore a principal can change the rules of promotions to fit his goal. Our paper aims to analyze the incentives of agents when both the tournament effect and the career concern effect are present, and the principal's optimal promotion rule.
So far, it seems that the papers discussing tournament leave career concern untouched, and those analyzing career concern have no tournaments. Lazear and Rosen (1981) model promotions as one-period tournaments, and argue that when it is costly to monitor agents' effort and outputs, risk-averse agents prefer the reward system based on relative performance (rank-based) to one based on absolute performance. Green and Stokey (1983) analyze how the information structure affects the advantage of tournaments. A tournament performs better when the common shock is important, but worse when the shock is unimportant. Malcomson (1984) traces the advantage of rank-based reward system to the principal's commitment to giving rewards, which in the output-based reward system he can forfeit by claiming that none fulfills the standard. The reward in a tournament can be purely monetary, not necessarily promotion. Fairburn and Malcomson (1994) show that if the reward is monetary, the workers might put effort in bribery or other influence activity. If the reward is promotion, and the higher-level job is important to the organization, then the organization will be less affected by influence activity since the personal favor the principal gets is small, compared with the organization's future. Fairburn and Malcomson (2001) show that when the agents are risk averse, there can be too little or too much promotion. Fama (1980) first discusses career concerns. He ICOI-2018 conjectures that the labor market provides enough discipline that contracts are not needed. Holmstrom (1999) shows that the incentive from career concerns is too much for an agent in the early stage of his career, and too little for one near retirement. Hence it is necessary to have contract. In different setups, Holmstrom and Costa (1986) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) discuss optimal incentive contracts when there is career concern. Costa (1988) introduces the signaling role of job assignment and promotion. The job market observes what a worker's job is and whether he is promoted, but not his output, which only his current employer observes. So the worker's internal reputation differs with his external reputation. The model shows that there is a misassignment of the worker to jobs and too little promotion. Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) analyze the connection between workers' career concern and job assignment in governments. Meyer and Vickers (1997) consider the interactions between the explicit incentives, which are contracts linking performance to pay, and the implicit incentives, including career concern and the ratchet effect.
A principal can manipulate the rules of promotion to fit his goals. Meyer (1991) shows that when effort do not affect output in a tournament of several rounds, it is optimal to favor the leader of early rounds by giving him advantage in the later rounds. However, Lazear and Rosen (1981) think it is necessary to handicap the leader in the tournament so that both the leader and the followers have incentive to keep on competing. We will explore the optimal bias in the promotion when there are both career concern and tournament effects.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we lay out our model. In section 3 we derive the workers' equilibrium effort given a promotion rule. Then we do the comparative statics in section 4. In section 5 we discuss the optimal promotion rules under two different goals. Section 6 is the conclusion.
The Model
Consider a firm (the principal) who hires two workers, = , . There are two periods, = 1, 2. In period 1, the two workers are assigned the same job . At the start of period 2, after observing the two workers' period-1 outputs, the firm promotes one worker to job and assigns the other the same job . In both periods, worker i's output in job , , is the sum of his ability , his effort , and disturbance , = + + (2.1) ICOI-2018 Output in job , , is affected more by workers' ability. Given the worker's ability, his effort , and disturbance , the output is
where > 1, Hence, other things equal, the firm will promote the worker with higher ability. The firm and the workers are risk neutral. The cost of effort to worker in job is ( ) 2 /2, and is ( ) 2 /2 in job , > 0.
Before production begins, none of the firm, the labor market, and the workers know either worker's ability, and they believe that is normally distributed with mean and variance 2 , = , and is independent of . Note that the two workers' expected ability can be different, which might be due to different schooling or training of workers before being hired by the firm. The disturbance terms are normally distributed with mean zero and variance ( ) 2 , = 1, 2 and are independent of . Let = ( , )), then the covariance matrix of the two disturbance terms is
where is the coefficient of correlation. If = 0, then the two workers' outputs in period 1 are independent variables. Let∆ = 1 − 1 , ∆ = − ,∆ = 1 − 1, and ∆ = 1 − 1 , then
Let (∆ ) , (∆ ) , and be the variance of ∆ , ∆ and ∆ respectively, then
, and = (∆ ) + (∆ ). The timing of the two-period game is as follows. We depict the promotion rule by a number . In period 1, the firm announces before production starts that worker will be promoted if ∆ > , be promoted if ∆ < , and each has equal probability to be promoted if
If > 0 ( < 0), then the rule favors worker ( ). Worker receives a wage 1 , and exerts effort 1. The firm cannot observe the effort of workers, but their outputs are observable by the firm and the labor market. The outputs are not verifiable and therefore 1 cannot be contingent on outputs.
In period 2, the promoted worker gets a wage and spend effort ; the other worker gets 2 , and puts in effort 2 . Then the outputs are realized. Since the labor market has the same information about the workers' ability, the workers cannot get a higher wage from other firms and so they stay with the firm if the wage offers are the ICOI-2018 same. Assume further that the firm will not hire someone from outside to fill in the job . The price of outputs is 1, and there is no discounting between the two periods.
We solve the game by backward induction. First we derive workers' effort in the two periods as functions of , the promotion rule, and then solve the firm's optimal .
The Efforts of Workers
We start with period 2. After observing period-1 outputs 1 and 1 , if the firm (and the labor market) presumes that 1 and 1 were the efforts of workers, then he can subtract from 1 and 1 the workers' effort to update his belief about their ability.
Denote ∆ = 1 − 1 the expected effort difference, and ∆ = − the difference of the means of the workers' ability, then the firm expects the distribution of ∆ to be normally distributed as (∆ + ∆ , ). Let the variance of 1 be , then
Given the period 1 outputs, the firm and both workers update their beliefs about both the ability of workers as:
Since period 2 is the last period, neither worker exerts any effort. Therefore the wages equal the expected outputs conditional on no effort. The promoted worker gets
The unpromoted worker gets ICOI-2018 Since the workers exert effort only in period 1, we drop the superscript from the effort terms 1 , and from the variance terms 1 . In period 1, the two workers choose effort simultaneously. Denote by worker ‵ conjecture about ‵ effort, and worker ‵ conjecture about x ‵ effort. From worker ‵ point of view, ∆ is distributed as ( 1 − + ∆ , ); and from ‵ view, the distribution is ( − 1 + ∆ , ). Let ( • ) be the density function of ∆ , then before worker chooses his effort, his total expected utility is
Where the second term is his expected income from being promoted, which occurs if ∆ > , and the third term the expected income if not. Similarly worker ‵ expected utility is
To simplify the above equations, we normalize the distribution ( • ) to be standard normal by the transformation
√ then we have
Where ∅( • ) and ( • ) are respectively the cumulative density and probability density function of the standard normal distribution. Worker chooses 1 to maximizes Where ∆ * = * 1 − * 1 . Since ( ( ) ) is the probability that worker is promoted, and 1− ( ( )) is the probability that is promoted. If ( ) <0, then worker has a greater chance to be promoted than ; and vice versa. Given , the first order condition (The second order condition is satisfied when is large enough) of maximizing We say that the rule favors ( ) formally if < 0 ( > 0), and that the rule favors ( ) in probability if ( ) <0(> 0). The right-hand side in (3.11) is the marginal cost of effort to worker , and the left-hand side the incentive to work. There are three kinds of incentives. First is the career concern, including the increase in the expected payoffs from job (the first term) and job (the second term) in period 2.
The larger ( ) is, the smaller the probability of being promoted and therefore the smaller the career concern. When ( ) goes to infinity, will be stuck with job for sure in period 2, and he only cares about the expected wage in job . In the other extreme, when ( ) goes to negative infinity, is guaranteed the job . Since > 1, he works harder the higher the probability that he gets promoted. Lazear and Rosen (1981) argue that it might be optimal to adopt a handicap system to discriminate against the more able worker so that both contestants would have incentive to keep on racing.
When workers have career concern, the handicap system might not be necessary.
The second incentive comes from the tournament effect, which is the third term.
When ( ) is zero, where ( ( ) ) is the largest, the competition is fiercest since each has equal chance of winning job . As ( ) goes to the two tails, ( • ) decreases and so does the competition.
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The third effect is in the last term, which we call it the hungry-dog-and-fat-cat effect (We borrow the animal names from Fudenberg & Tirole, 1984.). When ( ) = 0, the effect disappear. When ( ) >0, the promotion rule favors , but worker exerts more effort instead (hungry dog). And when ( ) <0, decreases his effort although he is favored (fat cat). Note that this effect is absent in models considering only career concern or tournament. Similarly, the first order condition (evaluated at = * 1 = 1 ) for worker ‵ effort 1 includes the above effects too.
The Nash equilibrium { * 1 , * 1 } is the solution to the simultaneous equations (3.11) and (3.12).
Comparative Statics
To solve the firm's optimal formal promotion rule c, we need to know first how the efforts of workers varies with the rule. Rewrite (3.11) and (3.12) as We then have the next result. Proposition 1. ∆ * decreases with , and ‵ ( ) >0.
Proposition 1 says that the gap of the two workers' effort narrows when the promotion rule favors more ( larger), and that has a one-to-one relationship with ( ).
But we do not know whether the result is due to that works harder and gets lazier, both work harder but works more, or both work less but x lazier. So we need the next proposition. Since ( ) increases with , and ( ) is favored in probability when ( )∈ 2 ( 4 ), the first two parts of proposition 2 says that when both workers' expected ability is large, and worker is favored in probability, then increasing further the advantage of the favored would reduce both workers' effort, but , the unfavored, reduces more than . ICOI-2018 When both workers' expected ability is small, changing the formal rule to favor would increase ‵ effort while reduce ‵ effort. Next we examine workers' incentive in the extreme cases to gain more intuition. We say that ( ) is almost sure to be promoted if ( ) → −∞ (∞) .
Promotion Rule and the Firm's Goal
Viewing promotion as the reward to a tournament, Lazear and Rosen (1981) propose that the firm might need to handicap the leader in order to maintain the intensity of the competition, without which neither the leader nor the followers have much incentive to work. However, in a setting where workers' effort is not a concern and the firm only wants to find the best one among his employees, Meyer (1991) shows that the firm should, during the later rounds, give advantage to the leader in the early rounds of tournament. The purpose of the bias is to make the results of the tournament more informative.
In this section we will analyze how the firm should design his promotion rule to fit his goal. Both tournament and career concerns affect the incentive of workers to work. In proposition 3, we have shown that a worker still has incentive to work even though he is almost sure to win. T His extreme case implies that lack of intensity of competition does not reduce the workers' effort as much as in the pure tournament models. On the other hand, favoring an early leader may or may not reduce workers' incentive. When the firm cares more about picking the right person for job , one might expect that the promotion rule is closer to Meyer's (1991) prescription. Yet we find that it is not the firm's goal that decides the optimal promotion rule.
It is instead the difference between the means and the variance of workers' ability that decides the rule. We first discuss the optimal rule when the firm cares only about picking the best person; that is, the firm wants to maximize his period-2 output. Then we analyze the optimal rule when he wants to maximize his period-1 output.
Promotion as a screening device
Suppose that the firm cares only about his period-2 output. Since the workers do not exert any effort in period 2, the firm wants to choose the worker with higher ability.
His optimal promotion rule is then the value of that maximizes the probability that the worker who wins the tournament in period 1 has higher ability. ICOI-2018 Let the prior distribution of the workers' ability difference be ( ), and the conditional probability density function of their output difference be ℎ (∆ | ∆ ), then
The firm chooses to maximize = (
where ( ) stands for the probability of the event :
subject to the constraints that workers' effort is * 1 and * 1 , both of which are functions of . The first order condition of (5.2) is:
Let the posterior density function of ∆ given that ∆ = bê(∆ | ), then we havê
where ( ) is the density function of the normal distribution ( ∆ * +∆ , ) , and that (∆ | ) is the density function of the normal distribution ( ( ), 2 ) , where
3) can be written as
If we let (∆ | ) = (∆ − ( ))/ , wherê(∆ ) = ( (∆ | ) is the density function of the standard normal distribution. The first order condition now becomes
Suppose that ∆ * / ≠ 1, then the firm must set ( ) = 0 (so that ∅ ( − ( ) ) = 0.5, or
From proposition 1, we know that ∆ * decreases with . Therefore (5.5) defines the optimal implicitly, which we denote by . In Figure 1 we draw two possible values of , one is positive and the other is negative. Condition (5.5) says that to maximize the probability that the winner is the more capable worker, the firm's promotion rule is a weighted average of ∆ * , the effort difference of the workers in equilibrium, and ∆ , the difference of the means of the workers' ability. In an extreme case, if (∆ )/ (∆ )
goes to zero, then the variance of ∆ should come from ∆ * and so is set to offset the effort difference. On the other hand, if (∆ )/ (∆ ) is large, then should give more consideration to ∆ .
Proposition 3.
1. If = and = 1, then = ∆ * and = 1.
2. If (∆ ) → ∞, then = ∆ * , but < 1. where workers' outputs are independent of effort, Meyer shows that to maximize the probability that the firm promotes the most capable worker, the firm should give edge to leader of early rounds of competition over the followers; that is, setting < 0 if is the leader. In our setting, the sign of has no fixed relationship with the sign of ∆ , while the sign of ( ) is the opposite of ∆ . Hence, the early leader (the one whose expected ability is larger) enjoys the edge in probability term instead of nominal term.
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Promotion as an incentive device
Suppose that the firm does not care about his period-2 output, and uses promotion solely to maximize period-1 outputs. Since the period-1 wages are independent of outputs, the firm's problem is * 1 ( ) + * 1 ( ) where * 1 ( ) and * 1 ( ) are the solution to (3.11) and (3.12) . From (4.1) and (4.2), we have
Let ( ( )) denote the right hand side of (5.6). Since affects ( ( )) only through ( ), the firm's objective becomes maximizing ( ( )) by ( ). The first order condition is
and the second derivative of is
Denote the terms in the square brackets of (5.7) by the function l( ( )), then ‵ = 0 if and only if = 0. Let the solution be ( ), then the second order condition requires
Since l( ( )) is a quadratic function of ( ), = 0 has roots if and only if
Suppose that ≥0, then the solution to l( ( )) that satisfies (5.8) is
which proves part (1). Part (2) follows from (5.7). The condition in part (3) implies that = , and hence by part (2), ( ) = 0. Part (4) follows from part (3) and (3.10).
Comparisons
We have shown the optimal promotion rules for the two different goals of the firm.
Here we shall compare how the two rules, and , differ. We start with some special cases. From part (5) of proposition 4, we know that to maximize the probability that the best worker is promoted, the promotion rule favors the leader (the one with higher expected ability) in probability. But from proposition 5, we see that when the firm wants to maximize period-1 outputs, the optimal promotion probability does not depend on Δ . This illustrates why there is a conflict for a promotion rule to serve both incentive and screening purposes. However, the two optimal rules might favor the same worker. The next corollary summarizes these cases. 
Conclusion
We have developed a model of promotion that encompasses both career concerns and tournament effect. We first shows that workers' effort incentive is not only affected by both career concerns and tournament effect, but also a combinative effect. Then we analyze how the firm's promotion rules should vary with his goals and the parameters.
When the firm wants to pick the best worker, the promotion rule favors in probability the worker with higher expected ability. When the firm wants to maximize his period-1 outputs, the promotion rule might favor either worker, depending on the variances of their ability and the disturbance. Since the latter rule does not depend on the workers' expected difference of ability, the two rules can differ. However, under some conditions, the two rules are consistent; namely the two rules both favor the same worker.
